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1. INTRODUCTION
The design of fault detectors with least dynamical
orders is an important aspect from practical point
of view. Although there are many approaches pro-
posed in the literature to design fault detectors,
as for example (Ding and Frank, 1990; Gertler,
1998; Chen and Patton, 1999) and literature cited
therein, only very few of them address explic-
itly the design of least order detectors (Yuan et
al., 1997; Frisk and Nyberg, 2001; Varga, 2003a).
An apparently open problem is to determine a
least order residual generator which achieves a
desired fault-to-residual influence matrix. This
problem has as main application the solution
of various fault isolation problems (Patton and
Hou, 1998; Gertler, 2000) and is traditionally
addressed by designing a bank of single-output
residual generation filters. However, the reduction
of the resulting total order of the bank of filters
was considered only in (Yuan et al., 1997) and at
present it appears that no systematic approach
exists to solve this problem.
In this paper we present an enhanced approach,
along the lines of dynamic covers based technique
of Varga (2003a), to design single-output residual
generation filters. A basic computational ingredi-
ent is a reliable numerical algorithm to compute
least order rational nullspaces of rational matrices
using state-space methods (Varga, 2003a). The
main computation in this algorithm is the or-
thogonal reduction of the system pencil matrix
to a Kronecker-like form, which allows to obtain,
practically without any additional computation,
a least order rational nullspace basis. This ap-
proach can be combined with coprime factoriza-
tion techniques to determine stable rational bases
which are candidate solutions to the fault de-
tection problem. The existence conditions of the
solution can be easily checked using the outcome
of the nullspace computation algorithm. Least or-
der fault detectors can be obtained by selecting
an appropriate linear combination of the basis
vectors by eliminating non-essential dynamics us-
ing dynamic covers based manipulations. We also
discuss the least order design problem for a given
fault influence specification. For this purpose, a
bank of least order residual filters is determined by
computing nullspace bases related to each row of
the fault influence matrix. The effectiveness of this
approach in conjunction with the assignment of
a uniform dynamics to all detectors is illustrated
via an application to the pitch axis actuator fault
monitoring for a Boeing 747 100/200 aircraft.
2. DESIGN OF LEAST ORDER DETECTORS
Consider the linear time-invariant system de-
scribed by the input-output relations
y(λ) = Gu(λ)u(λ)+Gd(λ)d(λ)+Gf (λ)f(λ), (1)
where y(λ), u(λ), f(λ), and d(λ) are Laplace- or
Z-transformed vectors of the p-dimensional sys-
tem output vector y(t), mu-dimensional control
input vector u(t), mf -dimensional fault signal vec-
tor f(t), and md-dimensional disturbance vector
d(t), respectively, and where Gu(λ), Gf (λ) and
Gd(λ) are the transfer-function matrices (TFMs)
from the control inputs to outputs, fault signals
to outputs, and disturbances to outputs, respec-
tively. According to the system type, λ = s in the
case of a continuous-time system or λ = z in the
case of a discrete-time system.
A residual generator for fault detection must
fulfill two basic requirements: (1) to generate
zero residuals in the fault-free case, for arbitrary
control and disturbance inputs; (2) to generate
nonzero residuals when any fault occurs in the
system. These requirements can be made precise
by looking for a linear residual generator (or
detector) of least dynamical order having the
general form
r(λ) = R(λ)
[
y(λ)
u(λ)
]
(2)
such that: (i) r(t) = 0 when f(t) = 0 for all
u(t) and d(t); and (ii) r(t) 6= 0 when fi(t) 6= 0,
for i = 1, . . . ,mf . Besides the requirement that
the TFM of the detector R(λ) has least possible
McMillan degree, it is also necessary, for physical
realizability, that R(λ) is a proper and stable
TFM. As detector, we can always choose R(λ) as
a rational row vector.
The fulfillment of requirement (ii) ensures that
faults produce non-zero residual responses. When
designing fault detectors this requirement for fault
detectability is usually replaced by the stronger
request that persistent (constant) faults pro-
duce asymptotically persistent (constant) resid-
uals. This requirement is known as strong fault
detectability and has a special importance for
practical applications.
The requirements (i) and (ii) can be easily tran-
scribed in equivalent algebraic conditions. The
condition (i) is equivalent to
R(λ)G(λ) = 0 (3)
where
G(λ) =
[
Gu(λ) Gd(λ)
Imu 0
]
, (4)
while the detectability condition (ii) is equivalent
to
R
(i)
f (λ) 6= 0, i = 1, . . . ,mf (5)
where R
(i)
f (λ) is the i-th column of
Rf (λ) := R(λ)
[
Gf (λ)
0
]
(6)
Enforcing the strong detectability of constant
faults is equivalent to ensure finite non-zero DC-
gains for each column of Rf (λ), thus to ask
0 <
∥∥∥R(i)f (λs)∥∥∥ < ∞, i = 1, . . . ,mf (7)
where λs = 0 or λs = 1 depending on the system
type (continuous or discrete).
From (3) it appears that R(λ) is a left annihilator
of G(λ), thus one possibility to determine R(λ)
is to compute first a minimal basis Nl(λ) for the
left nullspace of G(λ), and then to build a stable
scalar output detector as
R(λ) = h(λ)Nl(λ), (8)
representing a linear combination of the rows
of Nl(λ), such that conditions (5) or (7) are
fulfilled. The above expression of R(λ) represents
a parametrization of all possible detectors and
is the basis for the class of nullspace methods
introduced in (Frisk and Nyberg, 2001). While
this work relies on using polynomial nullspace
bases for Nl(λ), an alternative approach relying
on proper rational bases has been proposed by
the author (Varga, 2003a). The main advantage
of this latter method is to rely exclusively on
reliable numerical techniques based on state-space
computations.
In what follows, we discuss more in details the
two main design steps, namely, the determination
of Nl(λ) and the choice of appropriate h(λ) and
we discuss reliable numerical methods to perform
these steps.
3. COMPUTATION OF LEAST ORDER
RATIONAL NULLSPACE BASES
The approach to compute least order detectors
proposed in this paper is strongly connected to the
details of the computations of the left nullspace
basis Nl(λ). Therefore, in this section we summa-
rize the computational approach of (Varga, 2003a)
to determine least order rational nullspace bases
of a rational matrix which underlies the proposed
procedure. This method is also equivalent to the
pencil approach to design fault detectors proposed
in (Patton and Hou, 1998).
We assume the system (1) has the following de-
scriptor state space realization
Eλx(t)=Ax(t) + Buu(t) + Bdd(t) + Bff(t)
y(t)=Cx(t) + Duu(t) + Ddd(t) + Dff(t)
(9)
with the n-dimensional state vector x(t) and
where λx(t) = x˙(t) or λx(t) = x(t + 1) depending
on the type of the system, continuous or discrete,
respectively. In general, the square matrix E can
be singular, but we will assume that the linear
pencil A − λE is regular. For proper TFMs in
(1), we can choose a standard state space real-
ization where E = I. In general we can assume
that the representation (9) is minimal, that is,
the pair (A − λE,C) is observable and the pair
(A− λE, [Bu Bd Bf ]) is controllable.
The corresponding TFMs of the model in (1) are
Gu(λ) = C(λE −A)
−1Bu + Du
Gd(λ) = C(λE −A)
−1Bd + Dd
Gf (λ) = C(λE −A)
−1Bf + Df
The (p + mu)× (mu + md) TFM G(λ) in (4) can
be realized in state space form as
G(λ) =
 A− λE Bu BdC Du Dd
0 Imu 0

Assume that the rational matrix Gd(λ) has rank
rd ≤ min(p,md). It follows that a left nullspace
basis Nl(λ) satisfying
Nl(λ)G(λ) = 0 (10)
is a (p−rd)×(p+mu) rational matrix whose rows
are rational vectors which form a basis for the left
nullspace of G(λ).
The method described in (Varga, 2003a) exploits
the simple fact that Nl(λ) is a left nullspace basis
of G(λ) iff [Ml(λ) Nl(λ) ] is a left nullspace basis
of the system matrix
S(λ) =
 A− λE Bu BdC Du Dd
0 Imu 0
 .
Thus to compute Nl(λ) we can determine equiv-
alently a left nullspace basis Yl(λ) for S(λ) and
then Nl(λ) simply results as
Nl(λ) = Yl(λ)
[
0
Ip+mu
]
.
Nl(λ) can be computed (see bellow) by employ-
ing linear pencil reduction algorithms based on
orthogonal transformations. Bases with special
properties (e.g., stable) can be obtained by post-
processing Nl(λ), using the fact that if Nl(λ) =
M˜−1l (λ)N˜l(λ) is a stable left coprime factorization
(LCF), then the numerator matrix N˜l(λ) can be
equally employed as a left nullspace basis of G(λ).
Let Q and Z be orthogonal matrices (for instance,
determined by using the algorithms of (Beelen,
1987; Varga, 1996) such that the transformed
pencil S˜(λ) := QS(λ)Z is in the Kronecker-like
staircase form
S˜(λ) =
 Ar,reg − λEr,reg Ar,l − λEr,l0 Al − λEl
0 Cl
 (11)
where the descriptor pair (Al−λEl, Cl) is observ-
able, El is non-singular, and Ar,reg − λEr,reg has
full row rank excepting possibly a finite set of
values of λ (i.e, the invariant zeros of S(λ)). It
follows that we can choose the nullspace Y˜l(λ) of
S˜(λ) in the form
Y˜l(λ) =
[
0 Cl(λEl −Al)
−1 I
]
.
Then the nullspace of G(λ) is
Nl(λ) = Y˜l(λ)Q
[
0
Ip+mu
]
and if we partition
Q
[
0
Ip+mu
]
=
 Br,lBl
Dl

in accordance with the column partitioning of
Y˜l(λ), we obtain
Nl(λ) = Cl(λEl −Al)
−1Bl + Dl (12)
Thus, (Al − λEl, Bl, Cl, Dl), with El nonsingular,
is a descriptor system representation for Nl(λ).
Note that, to obtain this nullspace basis, we per-
formed exclusively orthogonal transformations on
the system matrices. We can prove that all com-
puted matrices are exact for a slightly perturbed
original system. It follows that the algorithm to
compute the nullspace basis is numerically back-
ward stable.
Consider now the detailed structure of the full col-
umn rank subpencil
[
Al − λEl
Cl
]
. We can assume
that this subpencil is in the following observability
staircase form
A`,`+1 A`,` − λE`,` · · · A`,1 − λE`,1
A`−1,`
. . .
...
. . . A1,1 − λE1,1
A0,1
 (13)
where Ai,i+1 ∈ IR
µi×µi+1 , with µ`+1 = 0, are
full column rank upper triangular matrices, for
i = 0, . . . , `. Note that this form is automatically
obtained by using the pencil reduction algorithms
described in (Beelen, 1987; Varga, 1996). The
left (or row) Kronecker indices of G(λ) result as
follows: there are µi−1−µi Kronecker blocks of size
i× (i− 1), for i = 1, . . . , `+1. The row dimension
of Nl(λ) is given by the total number of Kronecker
indices, thus
`+1∑
i=1
(µi−1 − µi) = µ0
It follows that µ0 := p − rd. The order of the
realization (12) is nl :=
∑`
i=1 µi and it was shown
in (Varga, 2003a) that this order is equal to the
least possible one.
4. CHECKING FAULT DETECTABILITY
We discuss shortly how conditions (5) or (7) can
be efficiently checked for a candidate detector
corresponding to the computed left nullspace basis
Nl(λ). For this, we use the outcome of the left
nullspace algorithm to compute
Q
 BfDf
0
 =
 ∗B˜f
D˜f
 ,
where the row partitioning of the right hand side
corresponds to the column partitioning of Y˜l(λ).
It easy to show that
Rf (λ) = Y˜l(λ)Q
 BfDf
0
 = Cl(λEl−Al)−1B˜f +D˜f
Since the pair (Al − λEl, Cl) is observable, check-
ing the condition (5) is equivalent to verify that[
B˜
(i)
f
D˜
(i)
f
]
6= 0, i = 1, . . . ,mf
where B˜
(i)
f and D˜
(i)
f denote the i-th columns of
B˜f and D˜f , respectively.
To check the strong detectability condition (7), λs
must not be a zero of R
(i)
f (λ). Direct evaluation
of R
(i)
f (λs) may be not possible if Nl(λ), and thus
presumably also R
(i)
f (λ), has poles in λs. However,
such poles can be easily perturbed by using a
randomly generated output injection K, to work,
instead of Rf (λ), with the perturbed
R˜f (λ) = Cl(λEl−Al−KCl)
−1(B˜f +KD˜f )+ D˜f
5. DETECTOR ORDER REDUCTION
Let Nl(λ) be a left proper nullspace basis of G(λ)
(i.e., satisfying Nl(λ)G(λ) = 0). In this section we
will address the choice of a vector h(λ) such that
the scalar output detector R(λ) := h(λ)Nl(λ) has
least McMillan degree.
Assume Nl(λ) has the standard state space real-
ization
Nl(λ) =
[
Al − λInl Bl
Cl Dl
]
(14)
where we replaced Al and Bl by E
−1
l Al and
E−1l Bl, respectively. It is easy to show that in-
stead Nl(λ) we can equally use
N˜l(λ) =
[
Al + KCl − λI Bl + KDl
Cl Dl
]
where K is an arbitrary output injection matrix.
Moreover, all solutions of order at most nl can be
generated in the form
R(λ) =
[
Al + KCl − λInl Bl + KDl
hCl hDl
]
(15)
where h is chosen such that (5) (or (7)) is fulfilled.
Thus the least order design problem can be refor-
mulated as follows: for a given h determine the
injection matrix K such that a maximum number
of eigenvalues of Al + KCl becomes unobservable
for the pair (Al + KCl, hCl). In a dual setting
in terms of transposed matrices, the least order
solution of the above problem can be recast as a
minimal order dynamic cover design problem.
Consider the set
J = {V : ATl V ⊂ Im C
T
l + V, Im
(
CTl h
T
)
⊂ V}
and let J ∗ denote the set of subspaces J of least
dimension. If V ∈ J ∗ then a matrix KT can be
determined such that(
ATl + C
T
l K
T
)
V + Im
(
CTl h
T
)
⊂ V
Thus, determining a minimal dimension subspace
V is equivalent to a Type I minimal order cover
design problem, and a computational approach to
solve it has been proposed in (Varga, 2003b). The
outcome of this method is, besides V, the matrix
K which achieves a maximal order reduction by
pole-zero cancellations.
The details of this procedure are presented in
(Varga, 2003b). The general idea is to perform
a preliminary orthogonal similarity transforma-
tion on the system matrices in (14) by applying
a special version of the controllability staircase
form algorithm (see for example (Varga, 1981))
to the pair
(
[CTl h
T CTl ], A
T
l
)
. With additional
block permutations and block row/column trans-
formations, we can bring the transformed system
matrices in the following special form
V −1AlV =
[
Â11 Â12
Â21 Â22
]
, V −1Bl =
[
B̂1
B̂2
]
,
[
Cl
hCl
]
V =
[
Ĉ11 Ĉ12
0 Ĉ22
]
,
where the pairs (Ĉ11, Â11) and (Ĉ22, Â22) are
observable, and the submatrices Ĉ11 and Â21 have
the particular structure
[
Â21
Ĉ11
]
=
[
0 A21
0 C11
]
with C11 having full column rank. Thus, by taking
K = V
[
0
K2
]
with K2 satisfying K2C11 + A21 = 0, we achieve
the cancellation of the maximum number of un-
observable eigenvalues. The resulting detector of
least McMillan degree, obtained by deleting the
unobservable part, is
R˜(λ) =
[
Â22 + K2Ĉ12 − λI B̂2 + K2Dl
Ĉ22 hDl
]
The main aspect which remains to be discussed is
the choice of matrix h. Generally with a randomly
generated h one achieves a detector whose order
corresponds to the maximum degree of a minimal
polynomial basis. This result can be justified by
looking at the details of determining polynomial
basis vectors. Using the Kronecker-like form based
method to determine a minimal polynomial basis
Nl(λ) proposed by Beelen (1987) (see also (Varga,
2003a)), the left polynomial basis is determined
using the resulting staircase form of the observable
pair (Al − λEl, Cl) in (13). The left Kronecker
indices µi, i = 0, 1, . . . , `+1, (recall that µ`+1 = 0)
provide the complete information on the number
of polynomial basis vectors of a given degree. The
main result of (Beelen, 1987, Section 4.6) in this
respect states that there are µi−1−µi polynomial
vectors of degree i − 1. The maximum degree is
thus ` and this is precisely the order which can be
achieved applying the cover algorithm. In the case
when no disturbance inputs are present, this is a
well know result in designing functional observers
(Luenberger, 1966).
Lower orders detectors can be obtained using par-
ticular choices of the row vector h. By exploiting
the details of the staircase form (13) of the pair
(Al − λEl, Cl) (see (Beelen, 1987)) we can show
that if only the last j elements of h are nonzero
(e.g., chosen randomly), then the corresponding
least order solution corresponds to a combination
of the first j vectors of the polynomial basis. In
this way, a systematic search can be performed by
generating successive choices of h with increasing
number of nonzero elements and checking for the
resulting residual generator the conditions (5) (or
(7)). The resulting detectors have non-decreasing
orders and thus the first detector satisfying these
conditions represents a satisfactory least order
design. For more details see (Varga, 2007).
6. RELATION TO OTHER APPROACHES
We discuss shortly the relationships of the pro-
posed method with other methods proposed in
the literature. The method of (Yuan et al., 1997)
achieves the order reduction of the detector by as-
signing the eigenstructure of the matrix Al +KCl
with multiple eigenvalues in a maximum number
of Jordan blocks. The dimensions of these blocks
are constrained by the observability indices of
the pair (Al, Cl) by the well-known fundamental
theorem of linear state variable feedback due to
Rosenbrock (1970, p.190). In single-output only
one Jordan block can exist for each distinct eigen-
value, and therefore this technique can be used
to cancel a maximum number of unobservable
eigenvalues. However, the computational proce-
dure sketched in (Yuan et al., 1997) relies on
a delicate eigenstructure assignment and is not
numerically reliable. Note that assigning multiple
eigenvalues leads in general to an increased sensi-
tivity of the eigenvalue problem. In a second com-
putational step, the non-observable part of the
resulting system must be eliminated. Performing
first an eigenstructure assignment to produce un-
observable multiple eigenvalues appears to be just
a computational trick and thus an unnecessary
computational detour. In contrast, the method
based on dynamic covers is a direct technique and
involves only reliable numerical computations.
A second approach addressing the least order
design has been proposed by Frisk and Nyberg
(2001) and relies on a polynomial approach. The
nullspace Nl(λ) is determined as a polynomial
matrix and a least order detector is determined
by building linear combinations of several ba-
sis vectors. Thus, the least order results as the
largest degree of the involved polynomials. Al-
though this method is not generally recommended
as a computational method due to the intrin-
sic ill-conditioning of polynomial representations
(see (Varga, 2003a)) especially for higher order
systems, still the approach provides insight into
the structure of the problem and allows to guide
the choice of least order candidates. Additional
difficulties are expected when converting the poly-
nomial basis into a rational basis and checking
conditions (5) (or (7)).
The last method we mention was proposed by the
author in (Varga, 2003a). The order reduction can
be achieved by selecting two disjoint components
Nl,1(λ) and Nl,2(λ) of the nullspace Nl(λ) and
computing appropriate Y (λ) such that Nl,1(λ) +
Y (λ)Nl,2(λ) has least order. The underlying com-
putational approach relies on employing Type II
dynamic covers. For each design, the conditions
(5) must be checked. The main problem with this
approach is that there are cases when the least
order can not be directly achieved. A typical case
is when a linear combination of the full nullspace
basis Nl(λ) is necessary.
7. SOLVING FAULT ISOLATION PROBLEMS
The more advanced functionality of fault isolation
(i.e., exact location of faults) can be often achieved
by designing a bank of fault detectors (Gertler,
1998) or by direct design of fault isolation filters
(Varga, 2004b). Designing detectors which are
sensitive to some fault and insensitive to others
can be reformulated as a standard fault detection
problem, by formally redefining the faults to be
rejected in the residual as fictive disturbances.
For a given detector R(λ) the corresponding fault
influence matrix S can be coded as
Sij = 1 if Rf,ij(λs) 6= 0
Sij = −1 if Rf,ij(λs) = 0 but Rf,ij(λ) 6= 0
Sij = 0 if Rf,ij(λ) = 0
If Sij = 1 then we say that fault j is strongly
detected in residual i. If Sij = −1 then the fault
j is only weekly detected in residual i. The fault j
is not detected in residual i if Sij = 0.
To solve a fault isolation problem, a given fault
influence matrix must be achieved by using a bank
of single output detectors. Each single output
detector achieves an influence matrix representing
a single row of the desired fault influence matrix.
For example, to achieve the complete isolation of
maximum k simultaneous faults the choice S = Ik
is necessary. In many practical applications such a
specification can not be achieved due to the lack of
sufficient number of measurements. Provided we
can assume that the faults occur one at time, a so-
called week isolation of k faults is possible using
a specification matrix whose i-th row contains all
ones excepting the element in column i which is
zero. For example, for 3 faults S is chosen as
S =
 0 1 11 0 1
1 1 0

If this fault influence specification can be achieved,
then the occurrence of fault i can be detected
if all residuals (excepting the i-th residual) are
non-zero. More insight on how to specify fault
influence matrices can be found in (Gertler, 2000).
For an efficient implementation and operation of
a residual generator (or a bank of such devices),
it is generally desirable to keep the order of the
fault detector(s) as low as possible. Thus, mini-
mizing the total order of the detector achieving
a given specification is important for practical
applications. Determining a detector of least order
for a given specification S is to the best of our
knowledge still an open problem. The only paper
addressing this problem is apparently (Yuan et
al., 1997). Unfortunately, no systematic approach
can be derived on basis of the results of (Yuan et
al., 1997) and the possible approaches are rather
ad-hoc and problem specific. In what follows we
suggest an alternative approach which usually
leads to detectors of quite low orders. Although
this approach does not provide a solution to the
least order design problem, its main advantage lies
in that all computational aspects can be addressed
using numerically reliable techniques.
The proposed approach is very simple and relies
on the least order design techniques developed
in this paper. For each row of S a single out-
put detector of least order can be determined,
leading to a global detector whose order is the
sum of the orders of the component detectors.
For practical reasons it is reasonable to assign
approximately the same dynamics to all detectors,
to ensure that the minimum detection times of
all faults are almost the same. Assigning identical
dynamics to all detectors has the following inter-
esting consequence: the resulting global dynamics
is usually non-minimal and thus an order reduc-
tion can be achieved by eliminating the uncontrol-
lable/unobservable eigenvalues.
This simple trick works well in many cases leading
to detectors of surprisingly low orders. We used
this technique for the example of Yuan et al.
(1997, Table 2), where a 18 × 9 fault influence
matrix S served as specification. Each line of S
can be realized by a detector of order 1 or 2 with
eigenvalues {−1} or {−1,−2}. The total order of
the resulting bank of detectors is 32, but after
performing the minimal realization procedure a
detector of total order 6 has been obtained which
achieves the same specification matrix. Recall that
the detector computed in (Yuan et al., 1997) has
order 14.
8. MONITORING PITCH AXIS ACTUATOR
FAILURES FOR A BOEING 747
A linearized nominal longitudinal model of a Boe-
ing 747 aircraft has the form (9), where the state,
input and output variables are defined as follows:
x =

δq
δVTAS
δα
δθ
δhe


pitch rate [rad/s]
true airspeed [m/s]
angle of attack [rad]
pitch angle [rad]
altitude [m]
 ,
u =

δeir
δeil
δeor
δeol
δih
δEPR1
δEPR2
δEPR3
δEPR4


right inner elevator [rad]
left inner elevator [rad]
right outer elevator [rad]
left outer elevator [rad]
stabilizer trim angle[rad]
thrust engine #1[rad]
thrust engine #2[rad]
thrust engine #3[rad]
thrust engine #4[rad]

,
y =

δα
δV˙TAS
δθ
δq
δVz
δhe


angle of attack [rad]
acceleration [m/s2]
pitch angle [rad]
pitch rate [rad/s]
vertical velocity [m/s]
altitude [m]

There is no the disturbance input d(t) in this
model. The state space model matrices are given
in Appendix A and correspond to a given set
of parameter values (mass = 317,000 kg, center
of gravity coordinates: Xcg = 25%, Ycg = 0,
Zcg = 0) and a specific flight condition – straight-
and-level flight at altitude 600 m and speed of
92.6 m/s with a flap setting at 20o and landing
gear up. For more details on the employed model
and for additional references see (Varga, 2007).
The fault inputs are defined as
f =

f1
f2
f3
f4
f5


right inner elevator fault[rad]
left inner elevator fault[rad]
right outer elevator fault[rad]
left outer elevator fault[rad]
stabilizer fault[rad]

and thus Bf = Bu(:, 1 : 5) and Df = Du(:, 1 : 5).
The maximally achievable fault influence struc-
ture is
S =

1 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 1
1 1 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 0
−1 −1 0 0 0
0 0 −1 −1 0
0 0 0 0 −1

From the last three lines of S it can be observed
that the isolation of faults grouped in three groups
(f1, f2), (f3, f4) and f5 is achievable, although all
faults are only weekly detectable.
The simplest fault detection task is to determine if
any actuator fault in the pitch axis occurred. This
comes down to design a fault detector achieving
the trivial influence structure
S1 =
[
1 1 1 1 1
]
by using the lowest order dynamics. To design
such a detector, the function fd from the Fault
Detection Toolbox described in (Varga, 2006) has
been used. Using the least order design option
implemented using the proposed approach, a first
order residual generator can be used for this task.
Provided we assume that the groups of faults
(f1, f2), (f3, f4) and f5 do not simultaneously
occur, the achievable specification
S2 =
 0 0 1 1 11 1 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 0

can be used for week isolation using the following
decision logic:
– inner elevator fault occurred if r1 = 0, r2 6= 0,
and r3 6= 0;
– outer elevator fault occurred if r1 6= 0, r2 = 0,
and r3 6= 0;
– stabilizer fault occurred if r1 6= 0, r2 6= 0,
and r3 = 0.
Using the least order design option, three first
order detectors can be obtained using the function
fdbank leading to a detector of total order 3.
Note that without the least order design option, a
detector of total order 10 results, while using the
standard observer based approach (Patton and
Hou, 1998), a detector of total order 15 is to be
expected.
A more realistic setting is to add actuator dy-
namics to each input actuator-surface channel.
The elevator dynamics can be approximated by
transfer functions of the form 37/(s+37), while for
the stabilizer dynamics we can take 0.5/(s + 0.5).
The resulting model has now order 10 and we can
achieve the same influence structure with a bank
of three detectors of total order 6.
Further enhancement of fault isolation is possi-
ble by employing direct measurements of surface
positions. For example, with a single additional
measurement of the stabilizer surface angle it is
possible to achieve the specification
S3 =
 1 1 0 0 00 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1

and thus to isolate inner elevator, outer elevator
and stabilizer faults. The above specification can
be achieved using a bank of three detectors of total
order 5.
Finally, a complete fault isolation (i.e., S4 = I5)
can be achieved by adding a minimal number of
three surface angle measurements from the two
left elevators and the stabilizer. The resulting
bank of five detectors has a total order of 6.
9. CONCLUSION
We proposed a numerically sound computational
approach to design least order fault detectors. The
least order detector is obtained using a systematic
search over single output detectors of increasing
orders built as linear combinations of rational
nullspace basis vectors. The order reduction is
achieved using Type I minimal dynamic covers
for which reliable computational techniques are
available (Varga, 2003b). The proposed method
can be effective also in obtaining low order detec-
tors which achieve given fault influence matrices.
A practical actuator fault monitoring example
illustrates the potential of this approach to solve
fault detection and isolation problems for a Boeing
747 aircraft. For the proposed new method soft-
ware tools have been implemented in the recently
developed Fault Detection Toolbox for MATLAB
(Varga, 2006).
The proposed least order design method is partic-
ularly effective in determining least order resid-
ual generation filter specifications achieving given
fault-to-residual influence matrices. These speci-
fications can be then used for more realistic de-
signs, where robustness against noisy inputs (e.g.,
wind gusts) and noisy measurements, as well as
robustness against parametric uncertainties must
achieved. The robustness aspects in conjunction
with least order design will be addressed in a
separate work.
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Appendix A. LINEARIZED BOEING 747
MODEL
A =

−0.4861 0.000317 −0.5588 0 −2.04 · 10
−6
0 −0.0199 3.0796 −9.8048 8.98 · 10
−5
1.0053 −0.0021 −0.5211 0 9.30 · 10
−6
1 0 0 0 0
0 0 −92.6 92.6 0

Bu =

−0.1455 −0.1455 −0.1494 −0.1494 −1.2860
0 0 0 0 −0.3122
−0.0071 −0.0071 −0.0074 −0.0074 −0.0676
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0.0013 0.0035 0.0035 0.0013
0.1999 0.1999 0.1999 0.1999
−0.0004 −0.0004 −0.0004 −0.0004
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

C =

0 0 1 0 0
0 −0.0199 3.0796 −9.8048 8.98 · 10
−5
0 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 0
0 0 −92.6 92.6 0
0 0 0 0 1

Du =

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −0.3122 0.1999 0.1999 0.1999 0.1999
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

